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T he 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development has been crystallised into concrete form through the 17 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
The IMF, World Bank and SDGs
The SDGs have required a thorough reassessment of the way the Bretton Woods Institutions 
operate. Are they still relevant, and what role should they play to advance the SDGs?
and 169 targets. These were meant to 
replace and carry on the unfinished agenda 
of the eight Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). The two Bretton Woods 
Institutions (BWIs), the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), were considered close partner 
organisations by the United Nations in 
terms of facilitating the implementation 
of the MDGs. They are also closely 
involved in partnering with the UN in the 
 Construction of Intumak Dam on the Nura River, 
Kazakhstan, part of a new generation of World Bank 
water projects. Large dams came to symbolise what 
many saw as the failings of the World Bank, a narrow 
focus on economy, with a debt burden attached 
©
 S
hy
na
r J
et
pi
ss
ov
a/
W
or
ld
 B
an
k
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS 2019
39UNIVERSAL GOALS
are ultimately transferring financial resources 
with the hope of repayment in some form or 
other. Hence they need to look at how and 
where repayments will be coming from. This 
does not mean they can ignore growth. But, 
equally, it does not rule out their interest in 
issues of social value, borne out by their close 
involvement with the SDGs. The BWIs’ 
earlier mistake was to believe that all it took 
to tackle broader issues of social development 
were higher rates of growth. 
Both the IMF and World Bank have 
undergone visible changes in the years since 
the MDGs. And this change is strengthened 
by the SDG’s better alignment with the 
IMF’s and World Bank’s mandates: both 
broadly at the levels of the five pillars 
The SDGs should provide a way for the BWIs to deliver 
both the Global Goals and their own remits as responsible 
lenders… it is possible to pursue social development 
alongside the maintenance of financial stability
implementation of the SDGs. However, 
their role (particularly that of the IMF) in 
implementing the MDGs came under close 
scrutiny, and was criticised by the UN and 
civil society organisations. To be fair to 
the IMF, while this criticism is not entirely 
lacking in merit, the MDGs were not as 
closely aligned with their mandate as some 
of the SDGs are. The World Bank, which 
has a treaty-based relationship with the UN, 
has been working relatively more closely 
with the UN as an implementation partner 
for both the MDGs and SDGs. But it too 
does not escape criticism. 
Facing a backlash
The objections against both the BWIs are 
on similar grounds: their focus on an almost 
canonical growth-first paradigm over other 
goals such as inclusion and environmental 
sustainability. The BWIs have been some of 
the strongest proponents of globalisation; 
promoting capital flows, liberalisation 
and privatisation, and are now facing a 
backlash from governments and civil-society 
organisations alike. Their ability to impose 
conditionalities on countries who have few 
alternatives for financing has also led to 
questions of whose side they are really on. 
Essentially, the logic of a multilateral 
financial order should be to help developing 
countries catch up with developed ones, 
so that bargaining power is more evenly 
distributed. That has clearly not been the 
case: developing countries have ratcheted up 
debt at an alarming pace and convergence 
with developed nations has slowed. For 
some, it is ironic that the BWIs are being 
made to revisit their aims through the SDG 
framework.
To state the issue another way: the BWIs 
are mandated to help countries achieve 
economic growth. This has normally meant 
a narrow definition of growth in terms of 
macroeconomic management (like debt 
sustainability) in the case of the IMF, and a 
deregulation-based framework in the case 
of the World Bank – for instance through 
its work through the ‘ease of doing business’ 
survey. This is why the BWIs have at times 
been at odds with many UN organisations 
whose focus on growth is more tempered 
and less rigid. 
UN agencies like the UNDP, UNIDO, 
UNESCO, UNCTAD or the UNFCCC 
that are working closely on the SDGs have a 
very clear socio-economic mandate and are 
not unrelentingly growth focused. But most 
importantly it is the governing structure of 
the BWIs that differentiates them from the 
universe of UN organisations. 
Most UN organisations are either under 
the purview of the UN Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) and UN General 
Assembly or report to them. The BWIs 
are only nominally under the ECOSOC’s 
purview. They have independent governing 
structures and are not substantively 
answerable to either the ECOSOC or the 
UN General Assembly. 
Decision-making within the BWIs’ 
governance structures lies with the developed 
economies, especially the US and Western 
European economies, while that of the UN 
agencies more closely reflects the multilateral 
UN structure. In fact, there is a historical 
controversy around the BWIs’ governance 
structure: namely, a failed early attempt by 
the ECOSOC to integrate the IMF and 
World Bank as specialised UN agencies. 
Attaining a balance
The SDGs should, however, provide a way 
for the BWIs to deliver both the Global 
Goals and their own remits as responsible 
lenders. This is because the way the SDGs 
are structured means that it is possible to 
pursue social development alongside the 
maintenance of financial stability. This is 
a key balance to attain. The issue is not 
about maximising returns: the BWIs aren’t 
looking for that either. Instead, they need 
to rule out interventions that have a high 
financial return but are socially damaging. 
As lending institutions with shareholders, 
they have to be financially responsible, as they 
of people, prosperity, planet, peace and 
partnership, and more specifically with 
respect to those SDGs related to ending 
poverty, reducing inequality, providing 
decent work, building strong institutions 
and climate change. For instance, some of 
the recent work done by the IMF has been 
on reducing inequality. There is recognition 
of the fact that high and sustained levels of 
inequality have a pronounced negative  
effect on social cohesion and are inimical  
to growth. 
The World Bank has moved closer to 
SDG 13 on climate action with its recent 
announcement that it will no longer invest 
in projects involving fossil fuels. Both BWIs 
have significant anti-corruption agendas 
and are already engaging with SDG 16 on 
building strong institutions. The Goals 
focused on eradicating poverty (SDG 1), 
providing decent work (SDG 8), or building 
sustainable industry (SDG 9) fit easily into 
the ambit of the BWIs. 
Issues of taxation pricing are critical 
to ensuring practical solutions for 
environmental sustainability. Here, the BWIs 
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can be called upon to work on these in line 
with the environmental SDGs: 6, 7, 12 and 
13. Gender equality (SDG 5) is also a critical 
focus area for both.
Playing a critical role 
But to consider the IMF and World Bank 
as partners only for specific SDGs is not 
doing justice to the range of capabilities 
they possess or how these complement 
the work of UN agencies. Indeed, the UN 
system has recognised this. The BWIs have 
a critical role to play in the ‘financing for 
development’ agenda. 
The IMF has embarked on a series of 
studies that outline what the financing gap is 
for funding the SDGs. This recognises the 
fact that achieving the SDGs will require 
significant investments by developing 
countries and need careful planning and 
foresight. For instance, according to an 
IMF study the increase in average additional 
annual spending to achieve some key SDGs 
by 2030 is 15 percentage points of GDP for 
the average low-income developing country. 
This is a huge ask for developing countries, 
so the competencies of the World Bank and 
the IMF are being mobilised to address this 
financing gap. 
Along with the United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
which provides capacity-building support 
to countries for the SDGs, the IMF and the 
World Bank can play a key role in country-
level uptake and monitoring through their 
programming experience and strong in-
country presence. 
The BWIs’ involvement in both finance 
and development means that they have a 
critical function to fulfil in terms of meeting 
the SDGs. Complementarities also exist with 
the UN agencies responsible for working on 
the SDGs. Thanks to external and, to some 
extent, internal pressure, it would be safe to 
say that the BWIs are no longer holding on 
to the orthodoxy of a growth-first approach 
over projects that deliver social value. As 
‘owners’ of the SDGs, it is important for the 
UN agencies to provide the correct nudge 
to the BWIs. But the BWIs have also come 
around to acknowledging that a broad-based 
shared prosperity is the key to ensuring 
global stability.  
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Strengthen the means 
of implementation 
and revitalise the 
global partnership for 
sustainable development
The sum of foreign direct investment (FDI), ODA and remittances by international 
migrants to low-income countries grew from $41.2 billion in 2007 to $68.5 billion in 2016. 
Remittances, which grew from $6.8 billion in 2007 to $19.9 billion in 2016, tend to be the 
most reliable, least volatile, source of income
Share of global merchandise and service exports from least developed countries, 
2001–2016 (percentage)
Goal 17 seeks to strengthen global partnerships to support and achieve the 
ambitious targets of the 2030 Agenda, bringing together national governments, 
the international community, civil society, the private sector and other actors. The 
targets and indicators attached to the goals recognise that for many Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs), share of global merchandise, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and 
remittances are just as important as Official Development Assistance (ODA).
 
In 2017, net ODA totalled $146.6 billion in 2017, a decrease of 0.6 per cent from 2016 
in real terms. ODA as a share of donors’ gross national income (GNI) remained low, at 
0.31 per cent. In LDCs, debt service as a proportion of exports of goods and services 
increased for five consecutive years – from a low of 3.5 per cent in 2011 to 8.6 per 
cent in 2016.
The developing regions’ share of world merchandise exports declined for two 
consecutive years: from 45.4 per cent in 2014 to 44.2 per cent in 2016.
Volume of foreign direct investment (FDI), ODA and personal remittances ﬂows, 
2007–2016 (billions of current US$)
Source: The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2018, UN
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